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Abstract
It is common to think that what theory of linguistic vagueness is correct
has implications for debates in philosophy of law. I disagree. I argue that
the implications of particular theories of vagueness on substantive issues of
legal theory and practice are less far-reaching than often thought. I focus
on four putative implications discussed in the literature concerning (i) the
value of vagueness in the law, (ii) the possibility and value of legal indeter-
minacy, (iii) the possibility of the rule of law, and (iv) strong discretion. I
conclude with some methodological remarks. Delineating questions about
conventional meaning, the metaphysics/metasemantics of (legal) content de-
termination, and norms of legal interpretation and judicial practice can moti-
vate clearer answers and a more refined understanding of the space of overall
theories of vagueness, interpretation, and law.
*Thanks to the Edinburgh Legal Theory Seminar for discussion.
Do theories of linguistic vagueness have implications for legal theory? That is, do
particular accounts of phenomena such as the sorites paradox and borderline cases
have implications for debates about (e.g.) the effects of vagueness on interpretation
and adjudication, the role of vagueness in legal texts, legal indeterminacy, or the
nature and fundamental grounds of law?
After an extended overview of his own theory of vagueness, Schiffer (2001)
concludes ‘no’: “having done a bit of homework, I have reached the conclusion that
philosophical theories of vagueness, even if true, have nothing to offer jurispruden-
tial concerns about vagueness” (Schiffer 2001: 421). Yet most have agreed that
what theory of vagueness is correct does have implications for philosophy of law.
Here is Endicott:
Vague laws… pose problems for philosophy of law.
Philosophical approaches to the [sorites] paradox seem to have impli-
cations for legal theory: arguments that vague terms are incoherent,
and that reasoning with them is impossible, would support arguments
that vague laws are incoherent. Since vague laws are an important part
of every legal system [Endicott 2001], the implications seem to be far-
reaching. (Endicott 2016: §2.3, emphasis added)1
I disagree.
I focus on four putative implications discussed in the literature concerning:
• the value of vagueness in the law (§1)
• the possibility and value of legal indeterminacy (§2)
• the possibility of the rule of law (§3)
• “strong” discretion (§4)
I argue that the implications of theories of vagueness on these issues are less “far-
reaching” than often thought:
• Pace Soames, epistemicism can capture the value of using vague language to
delegate authority over hard cases to future adjudicators.
• Pace Endicott, one’s theory about the linguistic (in)determinacy of statements
about borderline cases underdetermines one’s theory about the possibility of
indeterminacy in the law.
1I will generally use bold for emphasis, italics for referring to expressions of a language, and
single quotes for referring to strings.
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• Pace Endicott, if linguistic vagueness threatens the rule of law, it does so re-
gardless of what theory of vagueness, theory of legal content determination,
or conception of the ideal of the rule of law is correct.
• Contrary to commonassumptions (Soames, Endicott, Jonsson, Dworkin, a.o.),
one’s theory about the linguistic (in)determinacy of statements about border-
line cases underdetermines one’s theory about strong discretion and whether
exercises of discretion necessarily involve changing the law.
I conclude with some methodological remarks (§5).
Before getting started, some brief background on vagueness may be useful. In-
formally put, linguistic vagueness is an apparent fuzziness in the proper application
of an expression. Ostensively, vague expressions are expressions such as tall, bald,
rich, etc. Characteristic vagueness phenomena include apparent borderline cases,
tolerance, and sorites-sensitivity. Even when all the relevant facts are in, we may be
hard-pressed to say whether a man who is 5′10′′ is tall (for a man). Such “borderline
cases,” and the intuition that small changes in height don’t incur changes in whether
one is tall (“tolerance”), can lead to the sorites paradox. An application to the law
from Endicott is as follows (where in (2) xn is a tire with n fewer molecules of rubber
from its tread than a new tire):
(1) Sorites paradox (application to the law) (cf. Endicott 2016)
(P1) A new tire is not bald.
(P2) If a tire is not bald, it doesn’t become bald by losing one molecule of
rubber from its tread.
(C) So a tire never goes bald.
(C′) So no one can ever break the rule against careless driving by driving
with bald tires.
(2) (P1) x0 is not bald.
(P2) For all n, if xn is not bald, then xn+1 is not bald.
(C) ∴ For all n, xn is not bald.
(C′) ∴ A rule forbidding driving with bald tires can never be violated.
The premises seem true, and the argument seems valid.2 But the conclusion is false.
The challenge for theories of vagueness is to explain where the argument goes wrong
and yet why it seems so compelling.
I use labels such as ‘borderline cases’, ‘sorites-sensitivity’, etc. as descriptive labels
for the above sorts of linguistic phenomena. My usage doesn’t presuppose particular
2See Hyde 2014 for various formulations of the paradox.
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analyses— e.g., that the paradox is irresolvable, that borderline cases generate truth-
value gaps, or even that linguistic vagueness is to be understood as fundamentally
semantic.3 It is important to distinguish the notion of linguistic vagueness from
notions such as ambiguity,⁴ context-sensitivity,⁵ and (metaphysical, metasemantic)
indeterminacy.⁶ It is a substantive question how linguistic vagueness may lead to
indeterminacy in semantic or asserted content, and how vagueness in legal texts
may lead to indeterminacy in the law.⁷ The distinction between linguistic vagueness
and indeterminacy in legal content will be important throughout the discussion.
1 Case I: The value of vagueness in the law
I begin with an argument from Scott Soames (2012) that the debate between epis-
temicist and partial-predicate contextualist theories of vagueness has implications
regarding the value of vague language in legal texts (cf. also Endicott 2000, 2011,
Soames 2009, 2011, 2014; see n. 7). The upshot:
I conclude that whereas the genuine value of vagueness in the law is
naturally explainable on the theory that treats vagueness as a matter
of partial definition and context sensitivity, it cannot adequately be
accommodated by the epistemic theory of vagueness. (Soames 2012:
107)
Epistemicism claims that intuitively vague expressions P have precise but un-
knowable meanings and extensions (Sorensen 1988, Williamson 1994). Vague-
ness phenomena are symptomsof our ignorance of expressions’ precise extensions—
e.g., ignorance of the precise standard for counting as tall, the precise cutoff between
individuals that are bald vs. not bald, etc. Inductive premises such as (P2) in (1)–(2)
are false, and their negations— that there is a “sharp boundary” between the P and
3I follow common practice in speaking of “vague expressions” (predicates, terms, language).
My usage is neutral on whether linguistic meanings are themselves vague, or whether vagueness
phenomena arises from (e.g.) ignorance of precise meanings (Williamson 1994) or other properties
of typical concrete contexts of use (Lewis 1975, Silk 2016). Recent work in linguistic semantics has
stressed the importance of distinguishing sources of apparent vagueness phenomena, such as from
positive form gradable adjectives (e.g. tall) versus nominal predicates (e.g. vehicle) (cf. Sauerland
& Stateva 2011, Sassoon 2013, Morzycki 2015). For present purposes I bracket such potential
complications due to non-uniform treatments of linguistic vagueness.
⁴See, e.g., Williamson 1994: 66; Keefe 2000: 10, 157; Raffman 2014: 2–3.
⁵See, e.g., Williamson 1994: 215; Keefe 2000: 10; Silk 2015, 2016: §§6.2.2, 6.3.2.
⁶See, e.g., Barnes 2010 and references therein.
⁷I use ‘text’, ‘discourse’, ‘utterance’ broadly to include written and verbal uses of language.
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not P individuals— are true. Borderline cases b are items such that it’s impossible
to know whether b is P is true or false.
By contrast, theories such as partial-predicate contextualism deny that the lin-
guistic rules and non-linguistic facts determine precise extensions for vague expres-
sions in context (e.g., Klein 1980, Raffman 1996, Soames 1999, Shapiro 2006).
Vague predicates P denote partial functions partitioning a domain into a positive
extension posc(P), a negative extension negc(P), and an extension gap gapc(P) (the
“borderline cases”). However, in discourse speakers can “precisify” P by narrowing
the range of items b ∈ gapc(P) for which P is conventionally undefined. Speakers
can truthfully “go either way”— stipulate b ∈ posc(P) or stipulate b ∈ negc(P)—
depending on their conversational purposes.
The critical cases for distinguishing the theories are certain core borderline cases—
in particular, Soames claims, borderline cases which are more like things known to
be in the predicate’s extension. In short, Soames argues thus: Epistemicism cannot
capture the value of justifying different verdicts for such borderline cases given
different legislative rationales. Partial-predicate contextualism can. QED.
Soames’ argument is as follows. Consider two variants of Hart’s (1961/1994)
case of an ordinance No vehicles in the park. In Scenario 1, the rationale of the
law is to reduce pollution in the park, which has recently been disturbed by cars,
motorcycles, etc. In Scenario 2, the rationale of the law is to reduce overcrowding,
which has recently led to accidents on the roads and paths. Suppose a judge must
render a verdict regarding a core borderline case of vehicle—an item b such that
the truth-value of b is a vehicle is unknowable, per epistemicism, or conventionally
undefined, per partial-predicate contextualism—say, a skateboard. Assume that
judicial adjudication is “guided by a principle of fidelity to the law that assigns prior-
ity tomaintaining existing legal content when possible, while mandating decisions
that further legislative rationale when cases cannot rationally be decided on the
basis of existing content alone”; and that “legal content” is the assertive or stipulative
content of authoritative legal texts (Soames 2012: 107, emphasis added).
Partial-predicate contextualism warrants different verdicts in the two scenarios
given the different legislative rationales. vehicle as used by the lawmakers is un-
defined for borderline cases b such as skateboards. So the existing content of the
law implies neither Skateboards are vehicles nor Skateboards are not vehicles. Since
the case “cannot rationally be decided on the basis of existing content alone,” the
decision must be made on the basis of the legislative rationale— i.e., whether for-
bidding skateboards would further reduce pollution or overcrowding on the paths,
respectively. So in Scenario 1 the judge can truthfully assert Skateboards are not
vehicles; she can precisify by stipulating that skateboards ∈ negc(vehicle), making
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it the case that henceforth the content of the law doesn’t forbid skateboards from
the park. In Scenario 2 the judge can truthfully assert Skateboards are vehicles; she
can precisify by stipulating that skateboards ∈ posc(vehicle), making it the case that
henceforth the content of the law implies that skateboards are forbidden in the park.
Being able to justify different verdicts in this way highlights a valuable function
of vague language in legal texts. Lawmakers may be divided on how to classify
certain borderline cases. Future adjudicators may have additional evidence about
how certain classifications may promote or hinder the law’s general rationale. By
formulating the law using vague language the lawmakers can delegate authority over
difficult and contentious cases to those in a better epistemic position to decide in
light of the full facts of particular cases: “Hence the value of vagueness in the law”
(Soames 2012: 105; cf. 102).
Soames argues that epistemicism cannot similarly justify different decisions in
the two scenarios andhence cannot capture the valuable delegating function of vague
language in the law:
[S]ince the content of the statute already determines the legal status of
every borderline case, the first duty of the downstream authorities is to
assign the borderline cases that come before them the legal status those
items most probably already have.
[Since skateboards are]more probably vehicles than not… the epistemi-
cist cannot justify arriving at different verdicts in the two scenarios.
In this way, the epistemicist’s view of what vagueness really is prevents
him from recognizingmuch of the value that vagueness in the law really
has. (Soames 2012: 106; emphasis added)
According to epistemicism, there is a determinate but unknowable fact aboutwhether
(e.g.) skateboards are in posc(vehicle) or in negc(vehicle), and thus whether Skate-
boards are vehicles is true or false. So there is a determinate but unknowable fact
about whether the content of the law implies that skateboards are forbidden in the
park. Skateboards are more like things known to be in the positive extension of
vehicle (e.g., a car) than things known to be in the negative extension of vehicle (e.g.,
the number 7). So it’s more likely that the law implies that skateboards are vehicles.
So fidelity to the law requires the same verdict regardless of the legislative rationale.
So lawmakers cannot reasonably use vague languagewith the expectation that future
adjudicators will decide in ways that best promote the legislative rationale.
Key assumptions of Soames’ argument are that speakers’ rationales in using
an expression cannot provide evidence about the expression’s extension, and that
5
how “similar” objects count as being in a context is independent of factors such as
speakers’ rationales. These assumptions are questionable.
I suggest that epistemicism can capture a role for how speakers’ rationales may
affect extension in the metasemantics. Epistemicists treat an expression’s meaning
and extension as depending (at least in part) on facts about use. Such usage facts
include facts about the contexts in which the expression is (is not) used, speakers’
verbal dispositions to use (not use) the expression, speakers’ linguistic and extra-
linguistic goals when using and disposed to use the expression, and so on. One
might wonder why the fact that vehicle was used in a context c intending (say) to
reduce overcrowding/accidents couldn’t be among the usage facts which might, for
all we know, help determine the predicate’s extension— i.e., such that skateboards∈ posc(vehicle). Indeed a crucial component of Williamson’s (1994) account of why
vague expressions’ precise extensions are unknowable is that they are— to use a
phrase from Hawthorne 2006— semantically plastic: Slight changes in use can
lead to slight changes in vague predicates’ meaning and extension (cutoff, standard);
in nearby possibilities where the usage facts differ only slightly, the meanings and
extensions differ as well.
Given this epistemicist metasemantics and epistemology, the lawmakers’ ra-
tionale in using vehicle may, for all we know, be among the facts determining the
predicate’s extension and hence the content of the ordinance. So evidence about the
lawmakers’ rationale may, for all we know, constitute evidence about whether (e.g.)
skateboards are in posc(vehicle), and hencewhether skateboards are forbidden in the
park. So evidence for different rationales may justify different verdicts. Far from
being incompatible with this idea, epistemicism seems to positively predict a role
for considering legislative rationales in certain core borderline cases— even given
Soames’ assumed norm of adjudication that “assigns priority tomaintaining existing
legal content” (Soames 2012: 107). One can capture the value of “employ[ing] vague
language as a way of delegating authority over difficult cases” without diagnosing
the process in terms of “incremental, case-by-case precisification” of legal content
(Soames 2012: 105, 102).
Of course one might object to epistemicism’s metasemantics and commitments
about our irresolvable semantic ignorance. What is important here is simply that
Soames’ argument fails to provide an independent argument against epistemicism.
Whether vague predicates are conventionally undefined for certain borderline cases
may be less relevant to issues about the value of vague language in the law than
initially seemed.
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2 Case II: Indeterminacy in the law
It might seem obvious that what theory of vagueness is correct has implications
regarding the possibility of legal indeterminacy. Whether the linguistic facts about
the truth-values of sentences about borderline cases are determinate— e.g., whether
Skateboards are vehicles is determinately true or false—would seemdirectly relevant
to whether the legal facts about such cases are correspondingly determinate— e.g.,
whether skateboards are forbidden in the park. Hence Endicott writes, “[epistemi-
cist theories] imply that there is always a right answer to the application of a law
stated in vague language” (Endicott 2016: §2.3); “If [epistemicism] succeeds, then
the indeterminacy claim [(3)] is false” (Endicott 2000: 99).
(3) The Indeterminacy Claim (Endicott)
a. “[V]agueness leads to indeterminacy in the law.” (Endicott 2000: 58)
b. “[T]he law is indeterminate when there there is no single right answer
to a question of law, or to a question of the application of the law to the
facts of a case.” (Endicott 2000: 2)
Since Endicott wishes to maintain that the law may be indeterminate on certain
borderline cases, he rejects epistemicism:
(2) A legal theory should accept the indeterminacy claim.
…claim (2) only holds up if vagueness leads to linguistic indetermi-
nacy… Claim (2), therefore, relies on the rejection of the epistemic
solution to the sorites paradox [i.e. epistemicism]. (Endicott 2000:
74–75; emphases added)
Epistemicism of course can’t grant (what Endicott calls) the “traditional formu-
lation” of the indeterminacy claim, that “a vague statement is ‘neither true nor false’
in a borderline case” (2000: 58). Yet epistemicism can still grant interesting senses in
which vagueness may lead to legal indeterminacy— indeed that in decisions about
certain borderline cases there is “no single right answer to a question of law” or to
“whether the [vague] rule applies” (Endicott 2000: 2, 63).
What is at-issue is how linguistic vagueness can lead to indeterminacy of con-
tent— specifically, how vague language in legal texts can lead to indeterminacy in
the content of the law. To fix ideas suppose we understand “languages” in the man-
ner of Lewis 1975 as formal objects that assign precise semantic values, and let’s
individuate “words” (predicates, etc.) as lexical items (phrases) in languages thus
understood. The epistemicist’s metasemantics and epistemology of linguistic vague-
ness is understood as the claim that there is a determinate andunknowable fact about
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what (formally precise) language L is being spoken. Questions about borderline
cases b are understood as questions about what lexical item is expressed by the
relevant string of symbols/sounds— formally, whether the usage facts determine
that the string ‘P’ is a predicate P1 of a languageL1 such that b ∈ JP1KL1 , or determine
that ‘P’ is a predicate P2 of a language L2 such that b ∉ JP2KL2 . (I will continue to use
italics for expressions, and reserve single quotes for strings. J⋅KL is the interpretation
function which assigns precise semantic values to expressions of L.)
Oneway inwhich the epistemicistmight accommodate legal indeterminacy is by
adopting the following sort of toy substantive legal normandmetaphysics/metasemantics
of legal content determination:
(4) Indeterminacy-friendly epistemicist philosophy of law
In decisions about core borderline cases b of ‘P’:
a. Metasemantics/epistemology:
There is a determinate and unknowable fact about whether
(i) ‘P’ expresses a predicate P1 of a language L1 such that b ∈ JP1KL1 ,
(ii) or ‘P’ expresses a predicateP2 of a languageL2 such that b ∉ JP2KL2 .
b. Substantive legal principle:
(i) It is not impermissible for the judicial authority to proceed as if ‘P’
is a predicate P1 of a language such as L1,
(ii) and it is not impermissible to proceed as if ‘P’ is a predicate P2 of
a language such as L2.
c. Metaphysics of content determination:
(i) Deciding ‘b is P’ makes it the case that L1 is now being spoken,
and that the string ‘b is P’ now expresses a true statement about
the content of the law. (In the post-decision context c, ‘b is P’ =
b is P1 and Jb is P1KLc is true.)
(ii) Deciding ‘b is not P’ makes it the case thatL2 is now being spoken,
and that the string ‘b is not P’ now expresses a true statement about
the content of the law. (In the post-decision context c, ‘b is not P’
= b is not P2 and Jb is not P2KLc is true.)
First, such an account captures the informal idea that there is “no single right an-
swer” about how to decide on the basis of the existing legal materials. In the “No
vehicles in the park” scenarios from §1, one might decide ‘Skateboards are vehicles’
(as given Rationale 2), making it the case that a language such asL1 is being spoken,
that the string ‘vehicle’ = vehicle1, and that skateboards are forbidden in the park. Or
one might decide ‘Skateboards are not vehicles’ (as given Rationale 1), making it the
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case that a language such as L2 is being spoken, that the string ‘vehicle’ = vehicle2,
and that skateboards are permitted. Second, the account captures ideas about the
underdetermination of legal content. Since neither way of proceeding is legally
excluded, extra-legal considerations might provide the basis for a judge’s decision.
It’s not the case that the content of the law post-decision is legally determined by the
content of the law pre-decision. Indeed it is possible for a decision ‘b is not P’ to
express a true claim about the content of the law in the post-decision context even
if the string ‘b is P’ had expressed a truth in the (lawmakers’) pre-decision context.
These substantive points about legal theory and practice are compatible with the
epistemicist claim that there is a determinate linguistic fact about the lawmakers’
use of the relevant string ‘P’.
Two caveats: First, the substantive philosophy of law in (4b)–(4c) isn’t “anything
goes”: it’s not the case that anything a judge says is to be interpreted as true. The
principles in (4b)–(4c) apply only to decisions about genuine borderline cases b—
cases diagnosed as ones where it is determinate and unknowable whether b is in the
(anti)extension of the predicate expressed by ‘P’, as per epistemicism, or where b is in
the set gap(P) of items for which the predicate’s semantic value is undefined, as per
partial-predicate theories. Of course it may be contentious whether a given item is a
genuine borderline case; it is a substantive question of proper legal practice whether
lawyers/judges ought to explicitly acknowledge an item’s potential borderline status
in defending their clients/justifying their decisions. These questions are indepen-
dent of whether epistemicism is correct, or whether the semantic/asserted content
of the original legal text is determinate and unknowable vs. undefined.
Second, the formulation in (4c) treats the adjudicator’s mere linguistic act of
uttering ‘b is P’ as sufficient to make it the case that a language such as L1 is being
spoken and that the utterance expresses a truth about the content of the law. The
condition could be strengthened depending on one’s substantive views about hard
cases, e.g. requiring that the judge’s decision be precedent-setting in such-and-such
way. This issue is independent of whether epistemicism about linguistic vagueness
is correct. For instance, in a partial-predicate contextualist theory (§1), where P is
the partially defined predicate determinately expressed by the string ‘P’, the issue
would be reframed as whether the judge’s assertion of b is P suffices to make it the
case that b is now in posc(P), or whether b remains in gapc(P) until certain further
conditions obtain, e.g. that the decision is regarded as relevantly precedent-setting.
For expository purposes I will stick with the simpler formulation in (4c); the reader
may understand it as implicitly strengthened as per their broader views (“Deciding
‘b is P’ (assuming such-and-such further conditions C) makes it the case that…”).
9
3 Case III: The rule of law
Vagueness in the law raises a prima facie threat to the ideal of the rule of law. In
the ideal:
[L]aws must be open, clear, coherent, prospective, and stable, legisla-
tion and executive action must be governed by laws with those charac-
teristics, and there should be courts that impose the rule of law. The
organizing principle of these requirements is, as Joseph Raz puts it,
that ‘the law must be capable of guiding the behaviour of its subjects’.
(Endicott 2000: 185)
A natural idea is that the law shouldn’t be arbitrary. Yet it is hard to see how a judge
forced to make a decision about a borderline case or a cutoff in a sorites series could
avoid being arbitrary. After all, the worry goes, as far as conventional meaning and
one’s evidence are concerned, a speaker may “go either way.”
Endicott takes seriously the challenge from vagueness for the rule of law (esp.
2000: ch. 9). Summarizing:
Philosophers of law… have debated the nature of borderline cases, and
its implications for… the possibility of the rule of law. If the ap-
plication of vague laws is indeterminate in some cases, then in those
cases a judge (or other official) responsible for applying the law cannot
do so (and in fact, no one can use the law to guide their conduct).
(Endicott 2016: §2.3; emphasis added)
Vagueness may seem to pose a much worse puzzle [for the ideal of the
rule of law]… [I]f the law is vague, judges are sometimes called on to
resolve disputes for which the law provides no resolution. With respect
to such disputes, the law does not constrain the will of the judge… So,
when the law is expressed in vague language, the result is some degree
of arbitrary government… (Endicott 2000: 188, 189)
The challenge proceeds in two steps: (i) linguistic vagueness leads to legal inde-
terminacy; (ii) legal indeterminacy (prima facie) threatens the rule of law. Hence,
Endicott notes, two general strategies of reply are (i) to accept legal indeterminacy
and deny that it threatens the rule of law, as by revising one’s account of the ideal
(Endicott’s strategy); or (ii) to “reject [legal] indeterminacy. This could be done by
denying that the application of vague language is indeterminate in a borderline case.
The epistemic theory of vagueness makes that denial” (Endicott 2000: 58).
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PaceEndicott, if linguistic vagueness (borderline cases, sorites-sensitivity) threat-
ens the “possibility of the rule of law,” it does so regardless of what theory of vague-
ness, theory of legal content determination, or conception of the ideal of the rule
of law is correct. Linguistic vagueness can lead to apparent hard cases in which—
depending on which overall theory is correct— the law is determinate but unknow-
able or genuinely indeterminate. In such cases it may appear to the public as if, no
matter how the judge decides, the decision will be arbitrary. This appearance has the
potential to threaten trust in the judicial system and undermine subjects’ willingness
to regulate their plans in accordance with official pronouncements. The systemmay
lose the confidence and deference of those bound by it; it may no longer be able
to foster the “dispositions and attitudes that lead to default obedience to law,” and
hence serve its “essential function” in “creat[ing] opportunity paths for constructive
individual and shared action over time” (Railton 2019: 16). In practice judicial
authorities must be advised, implicitly or explicitly, about how to proceed and what
sorts of considerations (e.g. moral) may and may not be cited as grounds for one’s
decision. Either the resulting judicial practice will— actually or expectably, reason-
ably or unreasonably—undermine the rule of law, or it won’t. Whether, as a matter
of metaphysical fact, there is genuine legal indeterminacy is irrelevant. Knowing
that the law is determinate but irresolvably unknowable— alternatively, that the law
is indeterminate but the ideal only involves not “depart[ing] from the reason of the
law” (Endicott 2000: 187)— is of little comfort if worried about whether apparent
borderline cases will undermine the legal system’s ability to “guide the behaviour of
its subjects” (Raz 1979/2009: 214).
4 Case IV: Strong discretion
The final case I wish to consider concerns vagueness and Hartian (1961/1994: ch. 7)
discretion—“strong” discretion in the sense of Dworkin 1977: ch. 2:
[I]f a case is not clearly covered by an existing legal rule,…[e.g.] because
the rule contains vague or ambiguous terms, the deciding judge cannot
apply the law but must exercise his or her discretion to resolve the case.
Call this the DiscretionThesis. (Shapiro 2007: 25)
[In borderline cases the judge] will need to exercise strong discretion…
If his decision is used as a precedent, he will make new law. (Endicott
1997: 59)
[I]n hard cases…, owing to the indeterminacy of legal rules…, judges
are left with the discretion to make new law. (Green 2009)
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That is: (i) Vagueness and legal indeterminacy: There are hard cases for which
the content of the law fails to imply a determinate verdict, e.g. due to vagueness.
(ii)Discretion: Such cases can only be decided by applying extralegal standards, i.e.
by exercising Hartian strong discretion (hereafter simply “discretion”). (iii) Legal
change: Given the prior legal indeterminacy, such discretionary decisions change
the law. Considering these issues will provide a useful way of bringing together
points from the previous sections on epistemicist and non-epistemicist theories of
vagueness, linguistic and legal content, and indeterminacy.
It is common to think that one’s theory of vagueness has implications for one’s
commitments about discretion and whether discretionary decisions involve chang-
ing the content of the law (see also, e.g., Dworkin 1985: ch. 5, Endicott 2000,
Jónsson 2009, Soames 2009, 2012). The above theses about discretion are prima
facie contextualist-friendly and epistemicist-unfriendly; here is Soames:
Since, on [partial-predicate contextualism], there simply is no fact of
the matter about whether these borderline cases… are, or are not, vehi-
cles, the court’s inquiry must be directed toward other matters… Once
such a precedent-setting judicial decision has been reached, the content
of the law will change.
For epistemicism, …the effect of the decision on the content of the law
[is] different… If the decision is precedent setting, the content of the
law…will not change. (Soames 2012: 102, 104)
The thought is that insofar as epistemicism implies that the linguistic content of
the legal texts and thus the content of the law are determinate, legal decisions in
hard cases cannot be grounded in extralegal considerations and don’t change the
law; and, conversely, insofar as contextualism implies that the linguistic and hence
legal content may be indeterminate, certain decisions may need to apply extralegal
considerations and make new law. (One’s take on the upshot of these implications
would depend on one’s prior commitments about vagueness and discretion (“one
person’s modus ponens…”).)
First, we have seen that epistemicism about linguistic vagueness is compatible
with legal indeterminacy (§2): The hypothetical epistemicist philosophy of law in
(4) accepts that the linguistic content of a body of legal texts is determinate while
allowing that the content of the law may be indeterminate. Accepting epistemicism
is thus compatible with accepting that judges may exercise discretion in borderline
cases, in the sense of making a legal decision that isn’t determined by the previous
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content of the law. Yet it isn’t straightforward that what changes in a discretionary
decision is necessarily the content of the law.
Recall the “No vehicles in the park” case from §1. Suppose the judge decides
‘Skateboards are vehicles’. According to the epistemicist legal theory from §2, the
judge’s usage effects (inter alia) ametalinguistic/grammatical change inwhich lexical
item the string ‘vehicle’ expresses. So, in the post-decision context c, the contents
of ‘The law permitted skateboards in the park but now the law permits them’ and
‘Skateboards weren’t vehicles but now skateboards are vehicles’ are false:
(5) false: JSkateboards weren’t vehicles but now skateboards are vehiclesKLc
Such examples may be understood analogously to examples such as (6) involving
(actual or hypothetical) metalinguistic change.
(6) false: If we called tails ‘legs’, then horses would have one leg.
Howmany legs horses have doesn’t depend on our linguistic practices. In interpret-
ing the counterfactual, one evaluates the content of the consequent as determined by
the expressions’ actual meanings (i.e., the proposition that horses have one leg), at
the relevant possibilities described by the antecedent (i.e., possibilities where we use
‘leg’ the way we actually use ‘tail’). What is true is the sentence in (7). Analogously,
on the view under consideration, what is true in the judge’s context of use is not (5)
but (8).
(7) true: If we called tails ‘legs’, then the string ‘horses have one leg’ would express
a true sentence in the language we would be speaking.
(8) true: The string ‘skateboards are vehicles’ expresses a true sentence, though it
might not have expressed a true sentence in the pre-decision context/language.
It is instructive to contrast the sorts of examples in (5)–(8) with performative
utterances. After sincerely uttering ‘I promise to φ’, one can truthfully say:
(9) true: Now I am obligated to φ, but I wasn’t before uttering ‘I promise to φ’.
One’s sincere utterance with the performative verb is what creates one’s obligation.
By contrast, a sentence such as skateboards weren’t vehicles is false in the judge’s
context even if the string ‘skateboards aren’t vehicles’ would have expressed a true
sentence in the pre-decision context. The judge’s decision makes it the case that
producing the sounds ‘skateboards are vehicles’ constitutes a use of a true sentence
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of the language being spoken. Exercises of strong discretion needn’t be understood
as effecting changes in legal content.
Much of the discussion thus far has focused on showing that accepting an epis-
temicist theory of vagueness is, contrary to arguments in the literature, compatible
with a range of views on the import of vagueness for legal theory and practice. In
closing, it is worth observing that the opposite point holds as well: accepting a
non-epistemicist theory of vagueness needn’t require commitments to (e.g.) legal
indeterminacy or strong discretion.
To fix ideas consider a contextualist theory of vagueness such as developed in
Silk 2016 (“vagueness as contextual indecision”). As part of a general semantic/pragmatic
framework of “Discourse Contextualism,” the theory accepts the following commit-
ments regarding conventional meaning and use:⁸
(10) Contextualist philosophy of language (Silk 2016)
a. Semantics: Compositional derivations take as given a precise represen-
tation of context gc which provides semantic values for context-sensitive
expressions, e.g. precise standards/cutoffs for vague expressions.
b. Pragmatics: Uses of φ presuppose that the concrete discourse context
determines a representation (or family of representations) of context gc
such that JφKgc is true.
c. Metasemantics: Different concrete discourse contexts may determine
different representations of context, hence different standards/cutoffs.
d. Vagueness: Typical concrete contexts are compatible with a range of rep-
resentations of context, hence a range of standards/cutoffs.
The semantics is “contextualist” in the sense that intuitively vague expressions are in-
terpretedwith respect to the same sort of contextual parameter as paradigm context-
sensitive expressions (e.g., a contextually supplied assignment function gc (Heim &
Kratzer 1998)); as far as the conventions of the language go, different concrete con-
texts may supply different standards/cutoffs. Although derivations of conventional
meanings presuppose a particular formal representation providing semantic values
for context-sensitive expressions, concrete discoursesmay fail to determine a unique
representation of context. There may not be a unique formal representation that
counts as representing a given concrete discourse. In the case of intuitively vague
expressions, there are typically a range of live standards/cutoffs compatible with
⁸Silk 2016: chs. 6–7 is careful to focus on vagueness phenomena arising with gradable and
evaluative/epistemic adjectives, though I generalize the presentation here (see n. 3). For applications
of the framework to normative language in legal contexts, see Silk 2019.
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the speakers’ commitments. Vagueness phenomena are diagnosed (very roughly)
in terms of such “contextual indecision” about what standards/cutoffs to accept. A
borderline case b of (say) tallwould be understood as a casewhere b is tall is accepted
given some live standard/cutoff for counting as tall and rejected given some other
live standard/cutoff. Alternative ways we might resolve our indecision give different
verdicts about whether the predicate applies (Silk 2016: §6.3).
One way of extending this general framework to legal contexts and the law is
as follows. Contrast the hypothetical epistemicist philosophy of law in (4) with the
contextualism-based account in (11).
(11) Indeterminacy-/Discretion-unfriendly contextualist philosophy of law
a. Semantics and theory of vagueness:
DiscourseContextualism+ “vagueness as contextual indecision” (see (10))
b. Legal metasemantics/content determination:
Concrete legal contexts determine unique representations of context,
hence unique asserted contents for uses of intuitively vague expressions.
c. Substantive legal norms:
(i) In practice judges are to pragmatically presuppose that their con-
crete context determines the same representation of context as the
original concrete context of use.
(ii) In decisions about borderline cases, judges may not invoke inde-
pendent moral considerations as a basis for decision.
In discourse, concerns about arbitrariness typically lead speakers not to presuppose
precise standards. Yet sometimes our purposes can override such concerns. Avoid-
ing incoherence or gross error, as in a “forcedmarch” (dynamic) sorites series (Hor-
gan 1994, Soames 1999), can be one such purpose. Purposes of legal practice—
even maintaining the “rule of law” (§3)—might be another. The idea in (11) is that
legal discourse and practice call for presupposing that the concrete situation deter-
mines a stable representation of context which supplies (inter alia) standards/cutoffs
for intuitively vague expressions. Accepting this substantive extra-semantic claim in
the philosophy of law is compatiblewith accepting a contextualist theory of linguistic
vagueness such as outlined in (10). One can reject strong discretion and accept an
assumption of determinacy in legal contexts, while denying that it is required for
semantic competence or encoded in the very conventions of the language.
Of course one might wonder whether legal contexts are in fact distinguished
from typical discourse contexts in such a way that warrants the sorts of assumptions
of determinacy in (11) (cf. e.g. Dworkin 1985, 1991, Kelsen 1991, Lyons 1995).
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What is important for present purposes isn’t whether the overall contextualist theory
in (10)–(11) is plausible. What is important is that, as epistemicism is compatible
with accepting legal indeterminacy and a role for invoking extra-legal considerations
in decisions about borderline cases, non-epistemicist theories such as contextualism
are compatible with denying that vagueness leads to legal indeterminacy and that
decisions on hard cases require exercises of strong discretion. One’s theory about
the linguistic (in)determinacy of (e.g.) statements about borderline cases underde-
termines one’s treatment of discretion.
5 Conclusion
Let’s recap. It is common to think that what philosophical theory of linguistic vague-
ness is correct has implications for debates in philosophy of law. As Endicott writes:
Philosophical approaches to the [sorites] paradox seem to have impli-
cations for legal theory… Since vague laws are an important part of
every legal system…, the implications seem to be far-reaching. (Endi-
cott 2016: §2.3)
This paper has argued that the implications of theories of vagueness for legal theory
may be less “far-reaching” than often thought. I have focused on four arguments in
the literature concerning putative implications between theories of vagueness and
(i) the value of vague language in legal texts, (ii) the possibility of legal indetermi-
nacy, (iii) the possibility of the rule of law, and (iv) strong discretion. I argued:
(i) Pace Soames, epistemicism can
– acknowledge a legal role for considering legislative rationales in deci-
sions about certain core borderline cases, and
– capture the value of “employ[ing] vague language as a way of delegating
authority over difficult cases” to future adjudicators in a better epistemic
position to further the law’s rationale (Soames 2012: 105).
(ii) PaceEndicott, accepting linguistic determinacy about themeanings/extensions
of vague sentences is compatible with accepting the possibility of legal in-
determinacy. Accepting an epistemicist theory of vagueness is compatible
with accepting a legal theory— substantive legal principles and ametaphysics
of (legal) content-determination—according to which, in decisions about
certain core borderline cases,
– there may be “no single right answer” to the legal question of how to
decide, and
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– the content of the law pre-decision legally underdetermines the content
of the law post-decision.
(iii) Pace Endicott, if linguistic vagueness threatens the rule of law, it does so re-
gardless of whether (e.g.) the relevant linguistic or legal content is indetermi-
nate vs. determinate and unknowable.
(iv) Contrary to commonassumptions, one’s theory about the linguistic (in)determinacy
of statements about borderline cases underdetermines one’s theory about strong
discretion. For instance:
– Accepting epistemicism is compatible with accepting legal indetermi-
nacy and a role for invoking extralegal considerations in decisions about
certain borderline cases.
– Conversely, rejecting epistemicism in favor of (say) contextualism is com-
patible with denying, as substantive extrasemantic matters of legal the-
ory and practice, theses of legal indeterminacy and discretion.
I want to be clear about what my argument is not. I am not denying that there
is interesting practical and theoretical work to be done on issues of vagueness and
the law. Agreed: Vagueness in legal texts poses challenges for legal theory and prac-
tice. Linguistic vagueness raises difficult questions about (e.g.) how judges ought to
proceed in decisions about apparent borderline cases; how to maintain the rule of
law and public confidence and trust in the legal system; whether independent moral
considerations may provide a basis for decision; whether such moral considerations
would count as part of the law or fundamentally determining legal content. One’s
linguistic diagnosis of vagueness phenomena—borderline cases, the sorites para-
dox, tolerance—won’t help one make progress on such questions.
Much of the discussion has been negative, aimed at highlighting problems with
various arguments in the literature claiming implications of theories of vagueness for
legal theory. But there is a constructive lesson. By delineating issues concerning the
meaning, content, and function of vague language in the law, “the result can only be
healthy for all… disciplines” (Kaplan 1989: 537). Distinguishing questions about
(e.g.) substantive legal norms, legal interpretation, and themetaphysics/metasemantics
of (legal) content determination from the semantics proper can free up legal inquiry.
This can motivate clearer answers and a more refined understanding of the space of
overall theories of vagueness, interpretation, and law.⁹
⁹For points in a similar spirit, cf. Forrester 1989: chs. 2, 13; Silk 2016, 2019; Plunkett &
Shapiro 2017.
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